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Cowen, Circuit Judge: 
 Plaintiffs, 169 former employees of defendant Warnaco, Inc. 
("Warnaco"), appeal from an order of the district court that 
granted summary judgment in favor of Warnaco and denied 
plaintiffs' cross-motion for partial summary judgment as to 
liability on plaintiffs' claims for termination benefits pursuant 
to an employee benefit plan.  Plaintiffs claim on appeal that the 
district court erred by concluding that a complete rescission of 
a welfare plan does not implicate the amendment procedures 
required by section 402(b)(3) of the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3).  Because we 
conclude that a complete rescission of a benefit plan does 
implicate the requirements of section 402(b)(3), we will reverse 
the order of the district court and provide certain directions 
upon remand. 
 Plaintiffs also assert on appeal that the district court 
erred by: (1) failing to void a change to Warnaco's employee 
benefits plan that eliminated the plan's termination allowance 
policy where the plaintiffs did not receive adequate notice of 
this change; and (2) concluding that no genuine issue of material 
fact existed as to whether Warnaco intentionally misled the 
plaintiffs by not timely disclosing the elimination of the 
  
termination allowance policy.  Subsequent to the district court's 
decision in this matter, and while this appeal was pending, the 
Supreme Court decided the case of Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. 
Schoonejongen,     U.S.    , 115 S. Ct. 1223 (1995).  In light of 
the Supreme Court's decision in that case, and because we 
conclude that there are genuine issues of material fact in 
dispute, we will remand this matter to the district court for 
further findings of fact. 
 
 I. 
 Plaintiffs worked in production positions at Warnaco's 
Altoona, Pennsylvania plant, where Warnaco manufactured various 
types of fashion apparel.  In January of 1988, Warnaco published 
an "Employee Handbook" (the "1988 Handbook") and distributed it 
to all of its employees, including the plaintiffs.  The 1988 
Handbook described the company's termination allowance policy as 
follows: 
 
  Warnaco hopes that economic circumstances never makes 
[sic] it necessary to eliminate any jobs within the Company.  
Should this unfortunate circumstance occur, however, you may 
be eligible for a termination allowance.  For example, you 
may be eligible if Warnaco eliminated your job to achieve 
long-term savings to the Company.  A condition of 
eligibility is that the employee sign an agreement to 
release Warnaco from liability for employment-related 
matters. 
  In some cases, loss of employment will not make you 
eligible for a termination allowance.  For example, you will 
not be entitled to an allowance if termination of your 
employment occurs as a result of death, retirement, 
resignation, or discharge for misconduct or poor 
performance.  Entitlement to a termination allowance may 
also be affected if you receive any other termination or 
disability pay.  Furthermore, you will not be entitled to a 
  
termination allowance if, at or about the time of 
termination of your employment with Warnaco Inc., you are 
offered employment with Warnaco Inc. or any affiliate or 
subsidiary of Warnaco Inc., or any purchaser of Warnaco 
assets, at a salary not substantially less than your last 
current salary at Warnaco Inc.  You will also not be 
entitled to a termination allowance if, prior to termination 
of your employment, management has altered or rescinded this 
termination allowance policy. 
  Eligible employees are entitled to receive a 
termination allowance of one week pay for each completed 
year of service, with a minimum of termination allowance of 
two weeks. 
App. 116a-17a (emphasis added). 
 In a memorandum dated December 26, 1990, Stanley  
Silverstein, the Secretary and Assistant General Counsel of 
Warnaco, stated that, "effective immediately, the Termination 
Allowance Policy referred to in the Warnaco Employee Handbook, 
has been rescinded.  Employees separated from the employment of 
Warnaco on and after December 19, 1990 will not be eligible for 
any termination allowance."  App. at 120a.  This memorandum also 
directed that meetings be scheduled to communicate this change to 
all employees.  Id. 
 Plaintiffs contend that while one of Warnaco's vice 
presidents met with employees at the Duncanville, Pennsylvania 
warehouse and advised them of the rescission of the termination 
allowance policy, no such meeting was ever held with employees at 
the Altoona plant.  Further, plaintiff Francis Mentzer avers that 
Warnaco did not give written or oral notice that the termination 
allowance policy was being rescinded until a meeting was held on 
January 22, 1992 to discuss issues raised by the closing of the 
Altoona plant.  At that meeting, plaintiffs assert, employees 
  
questioned Warnaco Vice President Richard Mitchell as to whether 
they would be receiving the severance benefits provided for in 
the 1988 Handbook, and he informed them that no such benefits 
would be paid. 
 Warnaco claims, and plaintiffs do not dispute, that sometime 
in 1991, it published an updated Employee Handbook (the "1991 
Handbook") reflecting the elimination of the termination 
allowance.  Further, it is undisputed that Warnaco President and 
Chief Executive Officer Linda Wachner, by letter dated January 
16, 1991, advised employees about unfavorable economic times, and 
stated, "it has been necessary for us to take certain measures  
to protect the 11,800 members of our Warnaco family.  While such 
things as a salary freeze and changes in our severance policy are 
difficult, they represent the kind and quality of tapestry that 
we must weave to strengthen our company."  App. at 155a (emphasis 
added).  Plaintiff Mentzer acknowledges receipt of this letter, 
which he describes as "vague," and without reference to any 
rescission of the termination allowance policy.     
      No reference is made in the 1991 Handbook, or elsewhere in 
the record, to the procedure that was followed in eliminating the 
termination allowance or the precise date such action was 
accomplished.  More important, while plaintiffs concede that 
Warnaco began distributing the 1991 Handbook to new employees at 
other locations in 1991, plaintiffs allege that no employees at 
the Altoona plant ever received a copy of this updated handbook.  
Warnaco failed to produce any evidence that it distributed the 
1991 Handbook to employees at the Altoona plant. 
  
 Warnaco shut down its Altoona plant in early 1991, and 
terminated the plaintiff employees at different times from 
October 1991 through January 1992.  In light of Warnaco's refusal 
to pay severance benefits, the plaintiffs filed suit against 
Warnaco in the United States District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania alleging violations of ERISA and seeking 
the benefits due to them under the 1988 Handbook, interest, and 
attorney's fees.  Warnaco moved for summary judgment and 
plaintiffs cross-moved for partial summary judgment as to the 
issue of liability.  The district court granted summary judgment 
in favor of Warnaco and denied the plaintiffs' cross-motion.  
This appeal followed. 
 Plaintiffs relied heavily on our decision in Schoonejongen 
v. Curtiss-Wright Corporation, 18 F.3d 1034 (3d Cir. 1994), 
rev'd,     U.S.    , 115 S. Ct. 1223 (1995) in presenting their 
appeal.  Following the Supreme Court's decision in that matter, 
which reversed our prior panel decision, we ordered supplemental 
briefing on the question of the effect of the Schoonejongen case 
on the instant appeal.  We recognize, of course, that the 
district court did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court's 
decision in Schoonejongen for purposes of its decision concerning 
the granting of summary judgment.  
 
 II. 
 The district court exercised jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have 





 The plaintiffs' first claim is that the district court erred 
by concluding that a complete rescission of a welfare plan does 
not implicate the amendment procedures required by section 
402(b)(3) of ERISA.  Plaintiffs assert that it is illogical to 
suggest that while changes to a benefit plan which reduce 
benefits must follow the procedure outlined in section 402(b)(3), 
changes that totally eliminate plan benefits do not require such 
a procedure.  Further, plaintiffs assert that the district court 
misinterpreted dicta in Schoonejongen, 18 F.3d at 1040, in 
reaching its erroneous conclusion. 
 We exercise plenary review over the district court's rulings 
concerning statutory construction.  United States v. Barel, 939 
F.2d 26, 31 (3d Cir. 1991).  Section 402(b)(3) of ERISA states 
that every employee benefit plan shall "provide a procedure for 
amending such plan, and for identifying the persons who have 
authority to amend the plan."  29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3) (1988).  
Concededly, nothing in the language of this ERISA section 
indicates that an employee benefit plan must provide a procedure 
for terminating the plan.  Nevertheless, as the district court 
recognized, it is anomalous to suggest that ERISA offers 
employees protection from mere changes in employee benefit plans, 
but does not afford protection against wholesale elimination of 
benefits.  Ackerman v. Warnaco, No. 93-101J, slip. op. at 9 (W.D. 
Pa. August 8, 1994).  Further, the view that termination is 
  
categorically different from an amendment for purposes of 
402(b)(3) is at odds with the tenor of a previous decision of our 
court where we stated that, "ERISA generally allows employers to 
amend or terminate welfare benefit plans at will so long as the 
procedure followed is consistent with the plan and the Act."  
Deibler v. United Food & Commercial Workers' Local Union 23, 973 
F.2d 206, 210 (3d Cir. 1992) (emphasis added).  Accordingly, we 
agree with the plaintiffs that the requirements of section 
402(b)(3) apply to plan terminations as well as plan amendments.1 
 Warnaco asserts, and the district court agreed, that 
language in our previous decision in Schoonejongen supports the 
view that a complete rescission of an employee benefit plan does 
not implicate the requirements of section 402(b)(3).  Warnaco and 
the district court point to a passage in that decision where we 
stated: 
 
                     
1
.  We are aware that the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit has taken a different view in a recent decision.  See 
Aldridge v. Lily-Tulip, Inc. Salary Retirement Plan Benefits 
Committee, 40 F.3d 1202, 1210 (11th Cir. 1994).  In that case, 
the court determined that the purpose of preventing unanticipated 
amendments from defeating employees' expectations of benefits are 
not achieved by applying section 402 to plan terminations.  Id.  
The court reasoned that the notice and procedural requirements 
specifically tailored for terminations under 29 U.S.C. § 1341 are 
sufficient to keep employees apprised of their benefits under the 
plan and to promote certainty with regard to plan terminations.  
Id. 
 We are unpersuaded by this analysis.  We believe that an 
unanticipated termination of an employee benefit plan can have an 
even more devastating effect in defeating employees expectations 
of benefits than an unanticipated amendment.  In addition, we 
fail to see how 29 U.S.C. § 1341 ensures that employees will be 
apprised of a termination of their severance benefits.       
  
 Alternatively, [the employer] suggests that we should 
sustain the November 1983 announcement as a termination of 
its entire welfare benefit plan and the institution of a new 
plan without benefits for the retirees of the Wood-Ridge 
plant.  It points out that it reserved the right to 
terminate its plan as well as amend it and that § 
402(b)(3)'s requirement of a plan provision specifying a 
process for amendments does not apply to plan terminations.  
Because [the employer] could have terminated its entire plan 
without implicating § 402(b)(3) and could then have 
instituted a new plan without benefits for the Wood-Ridge 
retirees, [the employer] insists that it should be held to 
have accomplished the same result in "one step rather than 
two."  We are unpersuaded. 
Schoonejongen, 18 F.3d at 1040-41 (emphasis added).  According to 
Warnaco and the district court, this passage indicates that a 
complete rescission of a welfare benefit plan does not implicate 
the requirements of section 402(b)(3). 
 We are unpersuaded by such reasoning.  As a preliminary 
matter, our decision in Schoonejongen has been reversed by the 
United States Supreme Court, albeit not on the precise issue 
discussed in this passage.  Schoonejongen,     U.S. at    , 115 
S. Ct. at 1231 (reversing the prior decision of our Court).  More 
important, however, in this passage we were merely describing an 
argument of the employer.  We were not setting forth a rule of 
law or even providing persuasive dicta.  Because it is improper 
to give precedential weight to a mere characterization of a 
party's argument, we find that Warnaco's argument lacks merit.  
Accordingly, we will reverse the order of the district court 
granting summary judgment in favor of Warnaco and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
 On remand the district court must determine whether Warnaco 
complied with section 402(b)(3).  We pause briefly to provide 
  
certain directions.  The plaintiffs assert that Warnaco failed to 
comply with section 402(b)(3) because it failed to identify 
specifically the entity with the authority to alter plan 
benefits.  Warnaco counters that it expressly reserved the right 
of "the management" to alter or rescind the termination allowance 
policy, and that "the management" is sufficiently specific to 
comply with section 402(b)(3). 
 In our previous decision in Schoonejongen, we determined 
that designating "the Company" as the entity with authority to 
amend a benefits plan was not sufficiently specific to comply 
with section 402(b)(3).  Schoonejongen, 18 F.3d at 1039.  The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari on this precise issue, however, 
and determined that designating "the Company" as the entity with 
authority to alter the plan satisfied the requirements of section 
402(b)(3).  Schoonejongen,     U.S. at    , 115 S. Ct. at 1228-
29.  The Court reasoned that designating "the Company" is 
sufficiently specific because principles of corporate law provide 
a ready-made set of rules for determining who has authority to 
make decisions on behalf of the company.  Id. at    , 115 S. Ct. 
at 1229.  The Court also explained that the literal terms of 
section 402(b)(3) are ultimately indifferent to the level of 
detail in the identification procedure.  Id.  Although it is a 
close question, in light of the Supreme Court's decision, we 
conclude that designating "the management" as the entity with 
authority to alter the plan satisfies the requirements of section 
  
402(b)(3).2  Accordingly, on remand the issue to be determined is 
whether Warnaco's valid amendment procedure was complied with in 
this case.  The answer will depend on a fact-intensive inquiry 
into whether Warnaco's management actually approved the new plan 
provision rescinding the termination allowance policy. 
 
 IV. 
 Plaintiffs next argue that even if the rescission to the 
termination allowance policy was properly adopted, the district 
court erred by failing to void this rescission where the 
plaintiffs' did not receive adequate notice of the change.  
Plaintiffs assert that each affected employee is entitled to 
written notice of such rescission.  According to plaintiffs, the 
1991 Handbook evidencing the deletion of the termination 
allowance policy was not distributed at the Altoona plant at 
which they worked, and meetings were not held at the Altoona 
plant to advise the employees of this change. 
 Warnaco counters that ERISA does not require written notice 
to each affected employee.  Warnaco argues that meetings were 
held for most of Warnaco's 11,800 employees, and that one such 
meeting was conducted at the nearby Duncanville plant.  Warnaco 
also argues that the employees at the Altoona plant received a 
letter from Linda Wachner, Warnaco's CEO, explaining that the 
                     
2
.  The question is close because although designating "the 
management" as the body with authority to alter a plan in one 
sense is more specific than designating "the Company," companies 
act through well-recognized chains of corporate governance.  Who 
has authority to act on behalf of "the management" is less clear. 
  
company was experiencing economic difficulties and referencing 
changes in the severance policy.  Finally, Warnaco asserts that 
whether or not plaintiffs received notice of the termination 
allowance, their claim for benefits is barred because a 
procedural defect like defective notice does not give rise to a 
substantive remedy under ERISA. 
 The district court based its decision on Warnaco's final 
contention, that even if the plaintiffs did not receive notice, 
this procedural defect does not give rise to a substantive 
remedy.  Relying on Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 
1155, 1170 (3d Cir. 1990) and Berger v. Edgewater Steel Co., 911 
F.2d 911, 921 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 920, 111 S. 
Ct. 1310 (1991), the court determined that the caselaw of this 
circuit teaches that substantive remedies are generally not 
available for such violations.  Ackerman, No. 93-101J, slip. at 
10.  The court explained that while monetary relief is sometimes 
available in "exceptional cases" or if "extraordinary 
circumstances" are present, there was insufficient evidence of 
such circumstances in this case to warrant relief.  Id. at 10-11. 
 In Schoonejongen, the Supreme Court described a number of 
ERISA's core requirements and goals.      U.S. at    , 115 S. Ct. 
at 1230-31.  As the Court recognized in that case, ERISA requires 
that "`[e]very employee benefit plan shall be established and 
maintained pursuant to a written instrument.'" Id. at 1230 
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1)).  Further, as the Court 
explained, a written instrument is required to enable employees 
to determine exactly what his or her rights are under the plan.  
  
Id. (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1280, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 297 
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 5077-78).  Finally, 
as the Court noted, ERISA gives effect to the written plan scheme 
through a comprehensive set of reporting and disclosure 
requirements embodied in 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-31.  Id.  Certain of 
these reporting and disclosure requirements are at issue in this 
case. 
 ERISA requires that if there is a modification or change in 
a summary plan description,3 a summary of this modification or 
change must be furnished to each plan participant not later than 
210 days after the end of the plan year in which the change is 
adopted.  29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(1) (1988).  In addition, and 
"[m]ore important," ERISA requires that every plan administrator 
make available for inspection in the administrator's "`principal 
office' and other designated locations," a set of currently 
operative governing plan documents, which "necessarily includes 
any new, bona fide amendments."  Schoonejongen,     U.S. at    , 
115 S. Ct. at 1231 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(2)).4      
                     
3
.  A summary plan description contains information including the 
plan's requirements for eligibility for participation and 
benefits.  29 U.S.C. § 1022(b). 
4
.  Section 1024(b)(2) provides: 
 
 The administrator shall make copies of the plan description 
and the latest annual report and the bargaining agreement, 
trust agreement, contract, or other instruments under which 
the plan was established or is operated available for 
examination by any plan participant or beneficiary in the 
principal office of the administrator and in such other 
places as may be necessary to make available all pertinent 
information to all participants (including such places as 
the Secretary may prescribe by regulations). 
  
 Warnaco acknowledges that not all of its employees received 
notice of the rescission of the termination allowance policy 
within 210 days of the end of the plan year in which the change 
was adopted.5  Warnaco, however, suggests that a copy of the 
amended handbook with the rescission of the termination allowance 
policy was on file in the principal office of the plan 
administrator.  Unfortunately, Warnaco cannot point to convincing 
record support for its claim that the 1991 Handbook was on file 
in the plan administrator's principal office, and the plaintiffs 
assert that this is a disputed issue of material fact.6 
(..continued) 
 
29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(2) (1988). 
5
.  Once again, Warnaco argues that a termination of benefits is 
different from an amendment and is therefore not covered by the 
language of 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(1) which speaks of a plan 
"modification" or "change."  We find this argument unpersuasive 
for the same reasons we found Warnaco's argument concerning 
section 402(b)(3) unpersuasive -- we do not believe Congress 
intended to protect employees from undisclosed plan amendments, 
but leave them defenseless with respect to a plan termination, a 
change with potentially more dramatic effects.  We take no 
position, however, on whether the 210 day notice period 
sufficiently protects employees' rights.  Indeed, at least one 
court has determined that 210 days after the end of the plan year 
in which the change has been adopted is too long a period for 
employees to wait to be notified of changes in their rights, and 
that "prompt" notice will be required.  See Rucker v. Pacific FM, 
Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1453, 1459 (N.D. Cal. 1992). 
6
.  Counsel for Warnaco states, in a supplemental brief filed 
with this Court, that his law firm has spoken with Denise Kelly, 
the personnel manager for the Knitwear Division of Warnaco, and 
she has confirmed that copies of the 1991 Handbook were on file 
in the Duncanville personnel office and available for review by 
all Altoona and Duncanville employees.  As a preliminary matter, 
since Ms. Kelly's statements on this point are not part of the 
record before us, we cannot consider them.  Even more 
fundamental, however, the district court made no findings 
  
 We have repeatedly held that under ordinary circumstances 
defects in fulfilling the reporting and disclosure requirements 
of ERISA do not give rise to a substantive remedy other than that 
provided for in section 502(a)(1)(A) of that Act.7  See Hozier, 
908 F.2d at 1169-70 (declining to find an implied remedy for a 
violation of ERISA's reporting and disclosure requirements); 
Berger, 911 F.2d at 921 ("[T]his Circuit has apparently rejected 
the reasoning that substantive remedies, such as the severance 
pay the Employees seek on appeal, are available for violations of 
ERISA's procedural requirements."); see also Gridley v. Cleveland 
Pneumatic Co., 924 F.2d 1310, 1319 (3d Cir.) (declining to find a 
basis for equitable relief absent "extraordinary circumstances"), 
cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1232, 111 S. Ct. 2856 (1991).  Thus, even 
if as the result of Warnaco's negligence a copy of the 1991 
Handbook was not available for plaintiffs' review in the 
principal office of the plan administrator, and the employees did 
not receive written notice of the termination of their severance 
benefits within 210 days of the end of the plan year in which 
this change was adopted, we are unable to conclude that ERISA 
(..continued) 
concerning whether Duncanville, or any other location, was the 
principal office of the plan administrator. 
7
.  Section 502(a)(1)(A) of ERISA codified at 29 U.S.C. § 
1132(a)(1)(A) states that any administrator who fails to provide 
information required to be disclosed under ERISA within 30 days 
after a request for such information is made may in the court's 
discretion be personally liable for an amount of up to $100 per 
day from the date of such failure or refusal to provide the 
information, and may be liable for such other relief as the court 
deems appropriate.  29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(A) (referencing § 
1132(c). 
  
provides the remedy that plaintiffs seek.  Plaintiffs are limited 
to their statutory remedies under such facts. 
 
 V. 
 The plaintiffs' final contention is that the district court 
erred in determining that no genuine issue of material fact 
existed as to whether Warnaco intentionally misled the plaintiffs 
by not timely disclosing the elimination of the termination 
allowance policy.  According to the plaintiffs, even though 
substantive remedies are generally not available for an 
employer's violation of ERISA's reporting and disclosure 
violations, the remedy of striking a plan amendment is available 
where an employer is guilty of bad faith or active concealment 
with respect to a substantive plan change.  The plaintiffs point 
to the fact that meetings that were scheduled to inform the 
plaintiffs of the change in policy were never held, the fact that 
the 1991 Handbook was never distributed to the Altoona employees, 
and the fact that a letter of January 16, 1991 from Warnaco's CEO 
spoke of "changes" in (rather than the elimination of) the 
severance plan, to support their view that Warnaco was actively 
concealing the elimination of the severance policy in order to 
induce workers to stay at their jobs.      
 As we discussed above, substantive remedies are generally 
not available for violations of ERISA's reporting and disclosure 
requirements.  See Hozier, 908 F.2d at 1169-70; Berger, 911 F.2d 
at 921.  We have, however, recognized the possibility of a remedy 
where the plaintiff can demonstrate the presence of 
  
"extraordinary circumstances."  See Gridley, 924 F.2d at 1319.  
Such circumstances include situations where the employer has 
acted in bad faith, or has actively concealed a change in the 
benefit plan, and the covered employees have been substantively 
harmed by virtue of the employer's actions.  See Berger, 911 F.2d 
at 920-21;  Blau v. Del Monte Corp., 748 F.2d 1348, 1353-54 (9th 
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865, 106 S. Ct. 183 (1985).  
Further, we have acknowledged that reporting and disclosure 
violations can "wreak especially substantial harm" in the context 
of a dispute over the validity of a plan alteration.  Hozier, 908 
F.2d at 1168-69 n.15.  The district court concluded that the 
record contains "no evidence of the narrow `extraordinary 
circumstances,' which must be present for substantive relief to 
be available."  Ackerman, 93-101J, slip op. at 11.  We disagree. 
 At oral argument, Warnaco described its failure to 
distribute the 1991 Handbook to affected employees at the Altoona 
plant, its failure to hold scheduled meetings with Altoona 
employees, and its issuance of a letter concerning "changes" in 
the severance policy, as mere bureaucratic "bungling."  While we 
do not rule out the possibility that administrative error 
accounted for Warnaco's omissions, we conclude that a reasonable 
fact finder could infer from these facts and from the plaintiffs' 
evidence regarding the employment climate at the Altoona plant 
that Warnaco actively concealed the change to its severance 
policy in order to prevent employees at the Altoona plant from 
leaving.  Under such circumstances, we conclude that it would be 
inappropriate to deprive the plaintiffs of the remedy of voiding 
  
Warnaco's rescission of the termination allowance policy.8  
Accordingly, we will reverse the district court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Warnaco, and remand for further 
findings on this disputed factual issue.9 
 
 CONCLUSION 
                     
8
.  We find support for the remedy of voiding a rescission of an 
employee benefits plan in a portion of our previous decision in 
Schoonejongen that was not expressly reversed on appeal to the 
Supreme Court.  In that case, we explained that where we are 
asked to void a plan amendment we are in a situation "[u]nlike 
the situation in Hozier where the plaintiffs sought benefits not 
provided for in the plan."  Schoonejongen, 18 F.3d at 1040.  
Further, in Hozier, we implicitly recognized the possibility of 
striking down a plan amendment where there has been a reporting 
and disclosure violation concerning the amendment.  Hozier, 908 
F.2d at 1168-69 n.15.  We conclude that such a remedy is 
appropriate in situations of active concealment. 
 We point out that an inference of bad faith or active 
concealment does not arise simply from a failure to comply with 
ERISA's reporting or disclosure requirements.  It is the peculiar 
combination of Warnaco's alleged deficiencies in this case that 
raises a material issue of fact necessitating a remand. 
9
.  Warnaco also asserts that our decision in Hamilton v. Air 
Jamaica, Ltd., 945 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 
938, 112 S. Ct. 1479 (1992), precludes recovery for a violation 
of a notice requirement, even in situations of active 
concealment, where an employee handbook contains an express 
reservation clause.  According to Warnaco, where a plan document 
expressly reserves the right to alter or eliminate benefits, no 
additional notice to the beneficiaries is required to eliminate 
benefits. 
 As a preliminary matter, we note that in Air Jamaica, the 
employee handbook at issue expressly reserved the right to alter 
or eliminate benefits "without notice," id. at 76, a provision 
not contained in the description of Warnaco's termination 
allowance policy.  More fundamentally, however, we refuse to read 
Air Jamaica so broadly.  We did not intend in Air Jamaica to 
allow employers to absolve themselves of good faith compliance 
with their ERISA reporting and disclosure requirements simply by 
placing a reservation clause in their employee handbooks. 
  
 Because we find that a complete rescission of a benefit plan 
does implicate the requirements of section 402(b)(3) of ERISA, we 
will reverse the order of the district court.  Upon remand the 
district court must determine whether Warnaco complied with its 
otherwise valid procedure for altering plan benefits.  With 
respect to Warnaco's alleged reporting and disclosure violations, 
we will reverse and remand this case for a determination as to 
whether Warnaco acted in bad faith, or actively concealed the 
rescission of the termination allowance policy.    
                              
 
